In order to reduce resource consumption and improve transmission efficiency, in this paper, using single-particle states, a multiparty quantum privacy comparison size relationship (QPCSR) protocol is proposed. Without leaking the compared private message, the blinded secret integer is encoded into the relative phase of single-particle by performing unitary operation. After each of the transformed quantum states has been measured, respectively, the comparison result of n participants' secret integers is obtained. Security analysis shows that this protocol not only resists outside attack and participant attack, but also resists the semi-honest third-party (TP) attack. Compared with the other similar quantum privacy comparison equal relationship (QPCER) protocols, the proposed protocol has better flexibility and universality; compared with the other similar QPCSR protocols, it has lower resource consumption and higher communication efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
As an important part of classical secure multiparty computation (SMC), the classical privacy comparison (CPS) has two branches: one is to compare whether the participants' secret integers are equal or not. The other is to compare the size relationship of the participants' secret integers. In 1982, Yao [1] first proposed a CPS protocol to compare the size relationship of participants' secret integers, which is the ''millionaire problem''. The protocol can compare two rich people who is richer without revealing their wealth. In 2001, Boudot et al. [2] suggested a CPS protocol to determine whether the secret integers of two millionaires are equal or not, that is, the ''socialist millionaire problem''. However, Colbeck [3] indicated that the above CPS protocols are not absolutely secure under external attacks and participant attacks. Therefore, in order to enhance security, he added a semi-honest third-party (TP) to resist those attacks. For the CPS protocols mentioned above, their security is based on the computational complexity of mathematical problems.
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However, quantum computers can solve some computational problems in a short time, such as large integer decomposition and complex path search. Therefore, the CPS protocols have security vulnerabilities in quantum computing environments. In order to enhance security, some researchers extend CPS to quantum field. In 2009, Yang and Wen [4] proposed the first quantum privacy comparison (QPC) protocol, which encodes hash values into EPR pairs to compare the secret integers of two participants are equal or not. Since then, with the rapid development of quantum information and quantum computation technology, many QPC protocols [5] - [22] were proposed.
In the above QPC protocols, some are quantum privacy comparison equal relationship (QPCER) protocols [5] - [19] . For example, in 2017, Pan [14] proposed a QPC protocol based on χ-type entangled states, and next year he proposed another QPC protocol based on single particles [16] . However, both of them are two-party QPCER protocols, they can not compare the relationship of multiple participants at once. In order to improve the flexibility and universality of the protocols, some researchers proposed the multiparty QPCER protocols. Chang et al. [17] put forward the first multiparty VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ QPCER protocol using multiparticle GHZ class states. Afterward, Ji and Ye [19] proposed a multiparty QPCER protocol based on d-level two-particle Bell states and d-level (n + 1)particle cat states.
Other are quantum privacy comparison size relationship (QPCSR) protocols [8] , [20] - [22] . For example, Lin et al. [8] successfully proposed a QPCSR protocol by d-dimensional Bell states. Yu et al. [20] put forward a QPCSR protocol based on d-level single-particle states. Guo et al. [21] put forward a QPCSR protocol based on entanglement swapping of d-dimensional Bell states. However, those protocols [20] , [21] can only compare the size relationship of two participants by executing the protocol once. In order to improve the flexibility and universality of the protocols, Luo et al. [22] proposed a multiparty QPCSR protocol based on d-dimensional entangled states.
In the above single-party and multiparty QPCSR protocols, some of which have slightly higher resource consumption and communication costs than others. For example, compared with other protocols. Reference [8] needs a larger number of transmitted particles, and [21] needs more number of prepared particles. In order to increase flexibility and versatility, reduce resource consumption, and improve transmission efficiency, a multiparty QPCSR protocol based on single-particle is proposed in this paper. With the help of a semi-honest TP, the proposed protocol can compare the size relationship of n participants' secret integers within one time execution of the protocol. This protocol encodes the secret integer into the relative phase of quantum state. By performing unitary operations and quantum measurements on the quantum states, the comparison result of n participants' secret integers is obtained. Compared with other similar protocols, the proposed protocol has the following advantages:
(1)It compares the size relationship of secret integers rather than just equal relationship of ones, so that it is more flexible and universal.
(2)The secret integer is encoded into the relative phase of quantum state by performing unitary operation, which can reduce more quantum resource consumption.
(3)It transmits the 2-dimensional single-particle hiding the secret integer in the quantum channel to improve transmission efficiency.
The rest is arranged as follows: In Sect.II, we propose a multiparty QPCSR protocol with the help of a semi-honest TP. In Sect.III, the security is analyzed. In Sect.IV, we compare the proposed protocol with the other similar protocols. In Sect.V, we conclude the proposed protocol.
II. THE PROPOSED MULTIPARTY QPCSR PROTOCOL
In a 2-dimensional quantum system, a single particle with relative phase can be described as follows:
where θ α , θ β ∈ [0, 2π ], and satisfying |a| 2
The unitary operation shown in Eq. (2) can perform phase transformation on quantum states,
where θ ∈ [0, 2π].
A. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
There are two natural numbers q and d that satisfy this relationship d = 2q. In addition, n participants share a key C in advance though the quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol, where C (C ∈ Z q ) is a constant. Suppose that each participant P k (k = 1, 2, · · · , n) has a secret integer S k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , q − 1}. The n participants perform the following steps to obtain size relationship of their secret integers with the help of semi-honest TP. TP is semi-honest in the sense that she may misbehave on her own but is not allowed to conspire with anyone else. Note that the TP belongs to the second semi-honest model in [23] , [24] .
Step 1: TP prepares n single particles {|ϕ k = 1
Note that only TP knows the value of θ.
Step 2: TP first prepares a particle sequence with l decoy particles, which is denoted as G 1 . In G 1 , each decoy particle is randomly chosen from the set of quantum states
). Then TP inserts the particle |ϕ 1 into G 1 at random position to generate a new sequence G 1 . Further TP sends G 1 to P 1 .
Step 3: After confirming that P 1 has received the decoy particle sequence G 1 , TP checks the security of the transmission route between P 1 and herself. TP sends the positions and corresponding bases of decoy particles to P 1 . According to the received positions, P 1 measures the corresponding decoy particles using the right bases, and then returns the measure results to TP. TP checks whether the transmission route between P 1 and herself is secure or not by comparing the measurement results and their original states. If the error rate is less than the predetermined threshold τ (τ = 2 ∼ 8.9%), then the transmission route is secure, and TP sends an acknowledgement to P 1 ; otherwise, TP asks P 1 to terminate the protocol and start a new one.
Step 4: After removing the decoy particles in the sequence G 1 , P 1 performs unitary operation U (θ 1 ) = |0 0| + e iθ 1 |1 1| on the single particle |ϕ 1 = 1
. Note that C is the shared key among n participants.
Step 5: P 1 first prepares a quantum state sequence G 1 with l decoy particles, each of which is randomly chosen from the set of quantum states {|0 , |1 , |+ , |− }. Then P 1 inserts the particle |φ 1 into G 1 at random position to generate a new sequence G 1 . Further P 1 sends G 1 to TP. Step 6: After confirming that TP has received the decoy particle sequence G 1 , P 1 checks the security of the transmission route between TP and herself. P 1 sends the positions and corresponding bases of the decoy particles to TP. According to the received positions, TP measures the decoy particles using the right bases, and then returns the measure results to P 1 . P 1 checks whether the transmission route between TP and herself is secure or not by comparing the measurement results and their original states. If the error rate is less than the predetermined threshold τ , then the transmission route is secure, and P 1 sends an acknowledgement to TP; otherwise, P 1 asks TP to terminate the protocol and start a new one.
Step 7: Each of the remaining participants P k (k = 2, 3, · · · , n) performs a similar process as P 1 does in Step 2-6, until all sequences {G k |k = 1, 2, · · · , n} are sent to TP. After removing the decoy particles from the sequences {G k |k = 1, 2, · · · , n}, TP recovers the particles {|φ k |k = 1, 2, · · · , n}. Then she measures each quantum states
According to Eq. (3), the size relationship of n participants' secret integers {S k |k = 1, 2, · · · , n} can be obtained by comparing the size relationship of {χ k |k = 1, 2, · · · , n}. To any two χ i and χ j and their corresponding S i and S j , their mathematical relationships are as follows:
When the size relationships of all secret integers have been determined, TP announces the compared result to each P k (k = 1, 2, · · · , n) via an authenticated classical channel, respectively. We use a quantum circuit diagram to describe the execution process of the proposed protocol, as shown in Figure 2 . Here, we omit the security check processes.
In Figure 2 , TP first prepares n 2-dimensional single particles {|ϕ k = 1 √ 2 (|0 + e iθ β k |1 )|k = 1, 2, · · · , n}, and sends each of the set |ϕ k to the corresponding participant P k through the quantum channel. After P k receiving |ϕ k , he performs unitary operation U (θ k ) on it to obtain quantum state |φ k . Further he sends |φ k to TP through the quantum channel. Finally, TP uses quantum measurements to get the size relationship of the participants' secret integers.
An example is given for better understanding the proposed protocol, as shown in Table 1 . Suppose that there are 3 participants (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ), whose secret integers are S 1 = 3, S 2 = 9 and S 3 = 7 respectively. According to the proposed protocol, we set q = 11, d = 22, C = 5. Here, we omit the security check processes, the protocol is executed as follows:
Step 1*: TP prepares 3 single particles, i.e.
), and TP selects θ = 10π 22 as a fixed parameter.
Step 2*: After |ϕ 1 is inserted into the decoy particles sequence G 1 to form a new sequence G 1 , TP sends it to P 1 .
Step 3*: Suppose that no eavesdropper is detected, then the protocol go to Step 4*.
Step 4*: P 1 performs unitary operation U (θ 1 ) = |0 0| + e 8iπ 22 |1 1| on the single particle |ϕ 1 = 1
).
Step 5*: After |φ 1 is inserted into the decoy particles sequence G 1 to form a new sequence G 1 , P 1 sends it to TP.
Step 6*: Suppose that no eavesdropper is detected, then the protocol go to Step 7*.
Step 7*: P 2 and P 3 perform a similar process as P 1 does in Step 2*-6*, respectively. Here, we omit the security check processes. 
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, the security of the proposed multiparty QPCSR protocol is analysed from three aspects: outside attack, participant attack and TP attack.
A. OUTSIDE ATTACK
If Eve is a malicious outside attacker, then she may use intercept-resend attack or entangle-measure attack to eavesdrop participants' secret integers. Intercept-resend attack is that, in a quantum channel, Eve intercepts a sequence of particles embedded in a secret integer, and then she tries to resend the forged particles to escape interception detection. Entangle-measure attack is that, after Eve intercepts a sequence of particles embedded in a secret integer, and then she entangles an auxiliary particle with the one of the intercepted particles by an unitary operator.
If Eve tries to steal |ϕ k and |φ k in order to obtain P k 's secret integer, then she needs to perform intercept-resend attack or entangle-measure attack on G k and G k . First, we analyze that whether Eve can obtain P k ' secret integer by performing intercept-resend attack on G k and G k or not. In Step 2, TP sends each G k (k = 1, 2, · · · , n) to the corresponding P k though quantum channel. In Step 5, P k sends G k to TP though quantum channel. On each transmission route from TP to P k and P k to TP, each sequence G k (G k ) includes |ϕ k (|φ k ) and l decoy particles. The decoy particles randomly chosen from quantum states {|0 , |1 , |+ , |− } in Step 2 and Step 5. If Eve randomly selects a particle from the intercepted particles, the probability that the particle is a decoy particle is l l+1 . When Eve measures the intercepted decoy particles using Z base and X base, the probability that she selects the wrong measurement base is 1 2 . If Eve selects the wrong base to measure the intercepted particles, then her stealing attack will be detected, and the probability that he was detected is p e , where p e = 1 − ( l l+1 * 3 4 ) l , which approaches 1 when l is large enough. According to the analysis above, Eve can't get any valuable information about |ϕ k and |φ k using the intercept-resend attack, therefore, she can't eavesdrop secret integer of P k .
Second, we analyze that whether Eve can obtain P k 's secret integer by performing entangle-measure attack on G k and G k or not. Eve first intercepts any sequence G k and G k (k = 1, 2, · · · , n) in the transmission route TP to P k and P k to TP. Then, she entangles an auxiliary particle by unitary operator U E with any decoy particle. Finally, she tries to eavesdrop |ϕ k and |φ k by measuring the auxiliary particles. Assume Eve prepares the auxiliary particles E = (|E 1 , |E 2 , · · · , |E l , ), after she performed the unitary operator U E on the decoy particles, the quantum states are evolved as:
[|+ (a|0 |e 00 + b|1 |e 01 + c|0 |e 10 + d|1 |e 11 ) + |− (a|0 |e 00 − b|1 |e 01 + c|0 |e 10 − d|1 |e 11 )], (7)
where |e 00 , |e 01 , |e 10 , |e 11 are decided by unitary operator U E , and the parameters a, b, c, d are satisfied |a 2 |+|b 2 |+|c 2 |+|d 2 | = 1. In order to escape eavesdropping detection, when the decoy particle is |0 or |1 , Eve sets a = b = 0. When the decoy particle is |+ or |− , if Eve sets b = c = 0, then a|0 |e 00 = d|1 |e 11 will be obtained according to a|0 |e 00 − b|1 |e 01 + c|0 |e 10 − d|1 |e 11 = a|0 |e 00 + b|1 |e 01 − c|0 |e 10 − d|1 |e 11 = 0. Obviously, Eve can't distinguish a|0 |e 00 from d|1 |e 11 , so she can't get any useful information about |ϕ k and |φ k from auxiliary particles. Therefore, this protocol can resist entangle-measure attack.
According to the above analysis, the proposed protocol can resist the two typical outside attacks: intercept-resend attack and entangle-measure attack.
B. PARTICIPANT ATTACK
In order to enhance the security of the protocol, not only do we need to ensure that an external attacker cannot steal the participants' secret integers, but also ensure that dishonest participant cannot extract secret integers of the other participants. As an internal attacker, a dishonest participant is more likely to get the other participant's secret integer than an external attacker. 1)Single participant attack Since the roles of the n participants in this protocol are equivalent, we assume that P j is any one of the dishonest participant. If P j can't extract the secret integer of P k , where j = k, then no dishonest participant can get the secret integers of other participants through single participant attack. P j knows the value of C and the size relationship of secret integers of herself and other participants. In order to steal the secret integer of P k , P j need to steal |ϕ k and |φ k of P k . According to the analysis above on section outside attack, P j can't get any valuable information about |ϕ k and |φ k of P k . Suppose that the secret integers for P j and P k are x and y (x, y ∈ 0, 1, · · · , q − 1) respectively, if y < x, the probability that dishonest participant P j gets the secret integer y of P k is 1
x ; if y > x, the probability is 1 q−y−1 . The larger the value of q, the smaller probability dishonest participant gets the secret integers of other participants.
2)Joint attack of multiparty Assume that P i and P k are two dishonest participants, and their secret integers are a and b respectively, P m is an honest participant and her secret integer is c (a, b, c ∈ 0, 1, · · · , q − 1). According to comparison result, when a < c < b, the probability that dishonest participants P i and P k get the secret integer c of P m is 1 b−a−1 ; when c < a < b, the probability that dishonest participants P i and P k get the secret integer c of P m is 1 a ; when a < b < c, the probability that dishonest participants P i and P k get the secret integer c of P m is 1 q−b−1 . The larger the value of q, the smaller probability dishonest participant P i and P k get the secret integer of P m . If the joint attack of two participants is extended to the joint attack of multiple participants, then the probability calculation method of multiparticipant joint attack is the same as that of two-participant joint attack.
According to the above analysis, it can be concluded that the probability of success of a single participant attack is less than that of a multiparticipant attack when q is large enough. Moreover, even if attackers guess the real secret integers of other participants through single participant attack or joint attack of multiparty, they cannot verify it is right.
C. TP ATTACK
In the proposed protocol, TP prepares the single particles and calculates the comparison result of the secret integers of n participants. She may misbehave on her own but is not allowed to collude with anyone else. We analyze whether TP can steal the secret integers of the participants according to the proposed protocol.
According to Eq. (3), TP knows the sum of θ k and θ, and she also knows the value of θ , then she can calculate the value of θ k . TP knows θ k = (S k +C)π d , but she doesn't know what C is, so it can't know what the participant's secret integer S k is.
According to the above analysis, without revealing the participants' secret integers, the proposed protocol can resist attacks include outside attack, participant attack, and TP attack.
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
In this section, the proposed protocol is compared with the other similar protocols and the comparison results are shown in Table 2 , 3 and 4. Table 2 compares the properties of the proposed protocol and the QPCER protocols [14] , [16] - [19] from the following six aspects: Quantum state used, Result after quantum measurement, Quantum technology used, Number of participants, Number of protocol executions to compare n secret integers, Comparison of size relationship. From Table 2 , in quantum state used respect, it can be seen that [14] and the proposed protocol are 2-level single-particle protocols, and the others are d-level protocols. One binary bit of secret integer is encoded into a qubit in the QPCER protocols [14] , [16] - [19] , whereas a d-level secret integer is embedded into a single particle in the proposed protocol. Therefore, the proposed protocol can reduce more resource consumption in the particle preparation process than the other similar protocols. In result after quantum measurement respect, the proposed protocol gets a d-level integer through one measurement, the other protocols can only get one or two classical binary bit of secret integer through one measurement. In quantum technology used respect, both of the [14] and [17] use particles correlation in entangled quantum state to design the protocols, and the other Refs. use unitary operation to design the protocols. In addition, the [18] adds quantum Fourier transform to its protocol, and [19] adds quantum entanglement swapping to its protocol. In number of participants respect, the [17] - [19] and the proposed protocol compare the relationship of n participants' secret integers, but the [14] and [16] only compare the equal relationship of 2 participants' secret integers. In number of protocol executions to compare n secret integers respect, the [14] and [16] can only get the relationship between two participants' secret integers by executing protocol once. If they want to get the relationship of n participants' secret integers, then they need to perform their protocols n − 1 ∼ n(n+1) 2 times. However, the others and the proposed protocol can get the relationship of n participants' secret integers by executing protocol once. In comparison of size relationship respect, the proposed protocol compare the size relationship of the secret integers, but the other protocols only compare the equal relationship of the secret integers. It can compare the size relationship. Therefore, the proposed protocol have better flexibility, universality and practicability than the QPCER protocols. Table 3 compares the properties of the proposed protocol and the other QPCSR protocols [8] , [20] - [22] from the following five aspects: Quantum state used, Result after quantum measurement, Quantum technology used, Number of participant, Number of protocol executions to compare n secret integers. From Table 3 , in quantum state used respect, it can be seen that the proposed protocol is 2-level single-particle protocol, and the others are d-level protocols. Therefore, the proposed protocol is simpler than the other similar protocols in preparing particles. In result after quantum measurement respect, except the [22] does not use quantum measurement technology, the other similar protocols and the proposed protocol all use quantum measurement technology to obtain d-level integer. In quantum technology used respect, the [22] uses particles correlation in entangled quantum state to design protocols, and the other Refs. use unitary operation to design the protocols. In addition, the [8] and [20] add quantum Fourier transform to design their protocols, and the [21] adds quantum entanglement swapping to design its protocol. In number of participants respect, the [22] and the proposed protocol compare the size relationship of n participants' secret integers, but the [8] , [20] , [21] only compare the size relationship of 2 participants' secret integers. In number of protocol executions to compare n secret integers respect, the Refs. [8] , [20] , [21] can only get the size relationship between two participants by executing protocol once. If they want to get the relationship of n participants' secret integers, then they need to perform their protocols n − 1 ∼ n(n+1) 2 times. However, the [22] and the proposed protocol can get the size relationship of n participants' secret integers by executing protocol once. Therefore, the proposed protocol is more efficient and easier to implement than the other protocols. Table 4 compares the performances between the proposed protocol and the QPCSR protocols [8] , [20] - [22] from the following four aspects: Number of prepared particles, Times of calculation operations, Number of transmitted particles, Times of quantum measurements. Let n be the number of participants, and δ be the number of sample particles, l be the number of decoy particles, m represent the digit number of secret integer though m-ary (M = (M 1 , M 2 , · · · , M m )). The particles of proposed protocol are in 2-level Hilbert space, but the particles of Refs. [8] , [20] - [22] are in d-level Hilbert space, where qudit and qubit have relationship 1 qudit = log 2 d qubits = tqubits.
There are 2 participants in Refs. [8] , [20] , [21] , but n participants in [22] and the proposed protocol. Let n = 2, m ≥ 1, δ ≥ 1, t > 1, in number of prepared particles respect, the proposed protocol prepares 2 particles to design its protocols, but the other [8] , [20] - [22] prepare more than 2 particles to design their protocols in 2-level Hilbert space. Therefore, the proposed protocol reduces more resource consumption than the other protocols [8] , [20] - [22] . In times of calculation operations respect, the [22] uses neither unitary operation nor Fourier transform to design the protocol, in which there is the lowest number of calculation operations. The [21] and the proposed protocol have the same times of calculation operations less than those of [8] . In number of transmitted particles respect, The number of transmitted particles in the proposed protocol is the least when m > 2 and t ≥ 2. In times of quantum measurements respect, the number of quantum measurements of the proposed protocol is less than that of [8] and that of [21] when δ = l > 1, and is also less than that of [20] and that of [22] when l > m + 1. Suppose the number of participants n = 2, the number of sample particles δ = 4, the number of decoy particles l = 5, and the digit number of secret integer m = 4, the [8] , [20] - [22] are in 8-level Hilbert space, we can calculate t = 3. So in the five protocol, the numbers of particles prepared are 54, 12, 114, 24, 2, respectively, and the numbers of calculation operations are 4, 4, 2, 0, 2, respectively, and the numbers of transmitted particles are 84, 18, 24, 18, 22 , respectively, and the numbers of quantum measurements are 20, 18, 24, 18, 22, respectively. As shown in Figure 3 , it can be seen that the number of the transmitted particles of [8] is largest in the five protocols. The number of the prepared particles of [21] is largest in the five protocols. The proposed protocol has the least number of transmitted particles and prepared particles. The numbers of calculation operations and quantum measurements of the proposed protocol are roughly equivalent to those of the [8] , [20] - [22] .
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a multiparty QPCSZ protocol based on 2-dimensional single-particle. The protocol uses the unitary operation and quantum measurement, and with the help of TP, it can compare the size relationships of secret integers of n participants without revealing the secret integers, and only need to execute the protocol once to get the comparison result. The proposed protocol reduces the dimension of quantum states prepared, reduces quantum resources. It can resist outside attack, participant attack, and TP attack. In this paper, only the size relation of the secret natural numbers is considered, and the size relation of any integer or decimal is not involved. These contents are the direction of our future research.
